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Russian Perceptions of Belarusian and Ukrainian
Political Sovereignty, 2004-2008
Rasmus Nilsson
In this paper I seek to understand Russian perceptions of Belarusian and Ukrainian
political sovereignty between 2004 and 2008.1 Thus, the focus is on Vladimir Putin’s
second term as President of the Russian Federation – a period when the sovereign
status of these post-Soviet states had been consolidated to the extent that their demise
as internationally recognised actors was unlikely in the medium term.
I argue that Russian foreign policy perceptions towards Belarus and Ukraine during
this period were mainly influenced by what I define as the paradigm of Power.
However, I also contend that a paradigm of Nation remained significant, unlike a third
paradigm of Law. Since perceptions within both the paradigm of Power and the
paradigm of Nation indicated failure to accept Belarusian and Ukrainian sovereignty,
I conclude that Russian political elites had still not accepted the existence of the two
sovereign states, over a decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
My thesis is structured as follows: after the introduction I present the framework for
my analysis. Then follow the three main parts of the paper. Each concerns a separate
political issue relevant to the discussion at hand: territory, governance, and ideology.
Finally, I use the conclusion to summarise my main points regarding each of these
issues.
Framework
In this paper I address the interaction between international state-actors, Russia,
Belarus and Ukraine. Thus, my argument belongs within the disciplinary framework
of International Relations (Baylis et al. 2008a, 3). Furthermore, since my argument is
concerned with perceptions, the theory that frames my argument is post-Positivist and
Constructivist in nature. Post-Positivism relates to epistemology; to underlying
assumptions about what knowledge may be obtained about the world. Is it possible to
find ‘truth’, or are subjective standpoints all any analysis within the social and
political sciences may find (Marsh and Furlong 2002, 18-19)? Post-Positivists argue
the latter, seeking to understand, not explain the world (Bevir and Rhodes 2002, 131-
2). Furthermore, I draw on the ontological assumptions of Constructivism. Ontology
relates to underlying assumptions about what motivates events. Is it material factors,
including relative military or economic capabilities, or is it ideas and perceptions
about the world, about friends and enemies, that matter (Wendt 1999, 92-138)? Since
this article focuses on perceptions, it mainly follows the latter course, employing a
theoretical framework seldom used in analyses concerning post-Soviet developments.
1 The theoretical parts of this article appeared in an earlier article in the academic journal
Political Perspectives. The author would like to express my gratitude for the very valuable
feedback he received from the reviewers of Political Perspectives in this connection. Of
course, any mistakes in the present paper are the responsibility of the author alone.
Furthermore, the author would especially like to thank Dr Peter Duncan, Dr Felix Ciută,
Professor Margot Light, and Dr Bobo Lo for their substantial and very helpful feedback
concerning issues discussed in this article. Special thanks go to the organisers of the SSEES
Postgraduate Conference 2009 whose invaluable suggestions significantly helped improve the
article. Of course, any mistakes remain the sole responsibility of the author.
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Yet the impact of material factors cannot be completely ruled out. Thus, Russian
perceptions of Belarusian and Ukrainian political sovereignty were motivated mainly
by constitutive dialogues between political elites in these states, but also partly by the
imbalance of material capabilities between Russia and its neighbours.
For the purposes of my argument a few definitions are required. I define
‘sovereignty’ as ‘the rightful entitlement to exclusive, unqualified, and supreme rule
within a delimited territory’ (Baylis et al. 2008b, 587). The ‘political’ I define as any
issue concerning ‘the organizational stability of states, systems of government and the
ideologies that give them legitimacy’ (Buzan 1991, 19-20). Beyond this, my argument
discusses paradigms of Power, Nation and Law. I use ‘paradigm’ in the sense of
worldview, or Weltanschauung. This refers to a coherent set of assumptions regarding
the past, present, and future. Russian paradigms relating to Belarusian and Ukrainian
sovereignty interconnect with perceptions of ‘Russia.’ In other words, perceptions
concerning Belarusian and Ukrainian sovereignty are constituted by perceptions
concerning Russian sovereignty. Based on the study of academic literature, and
especially of a significant body of primary Russian-language sources, I have
discerned three major paradigms relevant for my argument. According to the
paradigm of Law, ‘Russia’ is the same as the Russian Federation. It originated as a
self-conscious construction, and the strategy of Russia for the present should be to
stabilise its position internationally, with an aim to eventual ‘normalisation’, in
accordance with established, predominantly Western, international rules and norms.
Here, Belarusian and Ukrainian political sovereignty is respected as separate from
that of Russia. In contrast, according to the paradigm of Power, ‘Russia’ is the same
as the Russian empire. That is, ‘Russia’ originated from specific, historical
developments, and its strategy for the present should be to widen the international
sphere of influence for Russia, with an aim to eventual ‘great power’ status. In this
paradigm, Belarusian and Ukrainian political sovereignty is subsumed under that of
Russia. This paradigm was the most visible between 2004 and 2008. Meanwhile, a
third paradigm, the paradigm of Nation, also significantly influenced Russian
perceptions. According to this paradigm, ‘Russia’ is the same as the Russian nation,
understood primarily, but not exclusively in an ethnic sense. This Russia originated
from a primordial, ahistorical state, and its strategy for the present should be to re-
gather the Russian people, with an aim to recreate a ‘pure’ Russia in the future. In this
paradigm Belarusian and Ukrainian political sovereignty is not accepted in their
current form. Parts of these states are perceived as legitimately belonging to Russia,
while other parts are seen to belong to states opposed to Russia.
Finally, I define as a Russian any individual describing him- or herself as Russian,
without considering their status of citizenship, cultural or ethnic background, etc.
However, the perceptions of some Russians are more significant for the purposes of
my argument than others. To discern whether a given individual belonged to a foreign
policy elite between 2004 and 2008, it is necessary to estimate roughly how closely
connected this person was to the contemporary power centre of Putin (Lo 2003, 42-
44). At the same time, however, since an important part of my argument concerns the
way in which perceptions of Russians, Belarusians and Ukrainians constantly
influenced and reinforced one another, this article will consider Belarusians’ and
Ukrainians’ perceptions of Russia, too.
Within this framework, the three main sections of this article analyse Russian
perceptions of Belarusian and Ukrainian sovereignty concerning territory,
governance, and ideology. Within each of these themes, the relative significance of
the paradigms of Law, Power and Nation within Russian elites’ perceptions of
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Belarusian and Ukrainian sovereignty is due to Russian domestic politics as well as
politics in Belarus and Ukraine. Any actor in international politics, including Russia,
Belarus and Ukraine, needs an identity, needs to be something different from, if not
necessarily opposed to, other identities (Hopf 2002, 7). The three paradigms outlined
above are examples of this. The paradigm of Power was co-opted by the Russian
political elite from the outset. However, this made it impossible for any other Russian
actors to define themselves in opposition to the regime without defining Russia
differently. At the same time, the Russian leadership failed to outline sufficiently and
consolidate the paradigm of Law as an acceptable alternative. The paradigm of Nation
thus filled this vacuum. At the same time, however, this development was also
reinforced by actions of Belarusians and Ukrainians. They contributed to
strengthening the paradigm of Nation in Russia by reacting to perceived Russian
aggression. Thus, the fact that Russian perceptions developed as they did depended on
the interaction of the Russian political elite with Russian as well as non-Russian
actors.
Territory
Law: International Legal Norms
Russian elite perceptions of Belarusian and Ukrainian territorial sovereignty could
rarely be grouped within the paradigm of Law. This tendency risked conflicting with
prevailing perceptions in Ukraine. The President of Russia, Vladimir Putin, had not
offered any new territorial guarantees to Ukraine during his first term. At the same
time, though, an opinion poll from September 2004 showed that 75 per cent of
respondents in Ukraine supported Ukrainian territorial sovereignty. This figure was
the second highest reported in similar polls conducted in Ukraine over the preceding
twelve years and, crucially, came before the presidential election of Viktor
Iushchenko (Shulman 2005, 34-5). Understanding that this represented a persistent
trend, the Russian commentator Sergei Dubynin reminded Russians in January 2005
that ‘there are no influential political or social forces in Ukraine, who would like to
engage with the task of direct unification with Russia’ (Dubynin 2005). Increasingly,
the same could be said about Belarus. A survey from December 2005 showed that
only 12 per cent of respondents there agreed that ‘Belarus and Russia should become
one state, with one president, government, army, flag, currency etc’. This proportion
had markedly dropped from 21 per cent one year before, and 28 per cent in late 2000
(Drakakhrust 2006, 108-19). Yet the Russian leadership did not arrive at the
necessary conclusions. Admittedly, at a press conference held jointly with Iushchenko
in December 2006, Putin stressed that the territorial dispute had to be resolved
through international law (Surkov 2007, 35). Yet this statement was provided out of
necessity rather than out of conviction, and subsequent Russian territorial claims
indicated that no permanent acquiescence to the Ukrainian position would take place.
The fact that Russians would not heed their neighbours’ demands also became
obvious in the discussion about Russo-Belarusian integration. Notably, in April 2007,
the Russian Ambassador to Minsk, Aleksandr Surikov, underlined how Belarusians
could not expect preferential economic treatment in any future union (Avimova
2007). This might have made economic sense, but only served to reinforce Belarusian
disinclination to integrate.
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Power: Union State Moving Forward
Yet the Russian leadership was unwilling to abandon the idea of Russo-Belarusian
integration. Previously, reintegration with Belarus and Ukraine had commanded
support in Russian leading circles during Putin’s first presidential term. In 2004,
opinions polls of the Russian elite showed that support for reintegration with Belarus
remained strong among all political groups. Indeed, within governmental elites a 34
per cent increase in favour of reintegration had been discernible over the previous five
years (Zimmerman 2005, 196, 207). Furthermore, Russians believed that if
inhabitants of Belarus had partly lost interest in integration this was due to
disillusionment with the project, not to any inherent animosity towards Russia.
Tellingly, a poll from 2004 revealed that twice as many Belarusian-speakers opted for
unification with Russia than did Russian-speakers themselves. Russian-speakers were,
on the contrary, much more interested in looking to the EU (Ioffe 2008, 84-85). It
might have been expected that the election of Iushchenko as Ukrainian President in
December 2004 indicated that Ukrainians had become more sceptical regarding
Russians’ intentions towards Ukraine. It might also have been expected that the
Iushchenko administration would seek to strengthen popular Ukrainian mistrust of
Russia. Indeed, a survey from February 2006 showed that only 19 per cent of
respondents intending to vote for Iushchenko’s Our Ukraine electoral bloc wanted to
unite with Russia and Belarus. However, at this time the former Prime Minister Iuliia
Tymoshenko’s coalition had become more successful, and among its prospective
voters 40 per cent wanted integration with Russia and Belarus (Katchanovski 2008,
371). In addition, support for such integration did not fall even as Putin openly
criticised the Ukrainian and Belarusian regimes. In Ukraine, Tymoshenko and her
supporters ignored previous Russian accusations of criminal activity against
Tymoshenko. In the meantime in Belarus, even during the trade war with Russia in
2006-7, opinion polls showed that 40 per cent wished for closer relations or
unification with Russia, while only 22 per cent would prefer closer relations or
integration with the EU (‘Natsional’nyi’ 2007). Putin wanted to take advantage of
such sentiments. In April 2007, he emphasised that ‘Russia is open to any kind of
integration [with Belarus]. We are ready to go as far as our Belarusian friends are
prepared to go’ (Putin 2007). At the same time, data showing economic progress were
also used to retain public support for the process. Vasilii Khrol, Deputy State
Secretary of the Russia-Belarus Union State, highlighted that the Union budget had
grown one and a half times between 2001 and 2006, and that turnover of goods within
the Union had increased almost threefold (Avimova 2007). This provided seemingly
concrete proof that continued integration was worthwhile, not only for Belarus, but
also for an increasingly chaotic Ukraine. Dissatisfaction with Iushchenko’s
Westernising project had grown, and in June 2007, a survey among inhabitants living
throughout Ukraine by the Eurasian Monitor International Research Agency showed
that 55 per cent of respondents were now willing for their state to enter into a union
with Russia (Marples 2008, 34-35).
Nation: Taking Territory back
Russian belligerence could easily change Ukrainian opinions, however. A serious
Russo-Ukrainian territorial clash had already taken place over the island of Tuzla in
the Kerch Strait in late 2003. Despite subsequent attempts at conflict resolution by
Prime Ministers Mikhail Kas’ianov and Viktor Ianukovych, the risk of Iushchenko’s
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election as President a year later confirmed to Putin that territorial threats might
remain necessary as a bargaining tool. Mostly, other politicians were left to present
the threats. In November 2004, the Mayor of Moscow, Iurii Luzhkov, thus attended a
self-ascribed separatist conference held in Severodonetsk in eastern Ukraine by
invitation from Ukrainian Prime Minister and presidential candidate, Ianukovych.
Luzhkov’s appearance had undoubtedly been approved by Putin beforehand, since the
Mayor of Moscow used the conference to present Putin’s support for Ianukovych’s
candidacy (‘Komu’ 2004). Additionally, the idea of separatism in south-eastern
Ukraine at this time had substantial popular backing. After Ianukovych’s defeat, a
popular survey conducted in the region in December showed that 20 per cent of
Crimeans and a remarkable 40 per cent in Donetsk wanted their region to separate
from the rest of Ukraine and join Russia (Shulman 2005, 44). Although these wishes
did not subsequently result in unrest, Belarusian observers at the time were
sufficiently worried for President Aleksandr Lukashenko to argue in May 2005 that
the Russia-Belarus union had reached an impasse because of Putin’s earlier proposal
that Belarus become part of Russia – a proposal that allegedly would result in a new
Chechnia west of Russia (Marples 2008, 25). Not many people believed Lukashenko,
and open military territorial conflict remained an unrealistic scenario for the region.
Yet diplomatic disputes showed no signs of détente, and by June 2006 official
delegations from Russia and Ukraine openly disagreed on border demarcation in the
Sea of Azov: ‘Russia is attached to the Kerch agreement from 2003, which was
signed by the presidents of the two states. [Ukraine] suggests changing the status of
the Sea of Azov, declaring the waters not internal, but international’ (‘Rossiia’ 2006).
In the case of Belarus, matters were different since territorial integration was,
officially, welcomed by both parties. However, in October 2006, Lukashenko
complained to visiting Russian journalists that the Russian authorities were hindering
the re-unification of Russia and Belarus by offering either nothing more than
cooperation like in the EU, or, conversely ‘that [Belarus] should be incorporated into
Russia [and] “even Stalin had not gone that far”’ (Savchenko 2006). No Belarusians
were allowed to contradict Lukashenko, and it was perhaps particularly ominous for
the prospects of future cooperation between Russia and Lukashenko that the
unquestioned leader of Belarus was the most outspoken critic of Russian territorial
ambitions. In Ukraine, on the contrary, Iushchenko’s administration had no interest in
increasing the dispute, but rather reacted to renewed provocations by Luzhkov. In
February 2007, the Mayor went to Sevastopol’, where he declared: ‘Here in the
legendary Sevastopol’, a city of Russian glory, we must talk about the developments
that tore Sevastopol’ and Crimea away from Russia [...] These developments were
undeserved’ Not unreasonably, Ukrainian authorities accused Luzhkov of interference
in Ukrainian internal affairs (Vas’kovskaia 2007). Perhaps they were prudent in doing
so as a precautionary step, for Luzhkov’s sentiments certainly had supporters within
the Russian executive. A civil servant of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
whom I interviewed in May 2007 repeatedly returned to discussing territorial
revanchism and potential divisions of Ukraine (Interview with civil servant, 2007). At
the pinnacle of his power, Putin provided similar threats. Eventually, in April 2008,
he reportedly warned American President George Bush that the entry of Ukraine into
NATO might prompt Russia to encourage the predominantly Russian-inhabited areas,
including Crimea and the eastern regions, to break away from the rest of the state
(Allenova et al., 2008, 1, 3). Thus, even borders officially agreed on were not secure
for the future.
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Governance
Law: Iushchenko in Moscow
Even under Kuchma by mid-2004 Ukraine was ranked as ‘partly democratic’ by the
respected international organisation, Freedom House – a result that surpassed all other
post-Soviet states, bar the Baltic States (Solonenko 2007, 140). Russia had certainly
lost democratic ground since El'tsin’s retirement, but this hardly seemed to concern
the presidential administration. There remained a token allegiance to the popular vote.
In October 2004, the Chairman of the Russian Electoral Commission, Aleksandr
Veshniakov, complained that the Belarusian referendum on constitutional
amendments allowing Lukashenko to stand for President again did not ensure public
control and should not be emulated by Russia (Marples and Pervushina 2005, 26).
However, few doubted that Putin planned to stay in control for many years, even if
public opinion should somehow turn against him. Indeed, the idea of sovereign
democracy that was becoming such a buzzword in Putin’s Russia was also visible in
relation to neighbouring states. In December 2004, before the re-run of the second
round of the Ukrainian presidential election, between Iushchenko and Ianukovych,
Putin did state that the Ukrainian crisis ‘can only be solved democratically, that is on
a legal basis, and not under external or internal pressure according to political bias,’
but this was primarily a demand for Western actors to refrain from assisting the
Ukrainian opposition (‘Vladimir’ 2004). Iushchenko still won, and in January 2005,
the co-chairman of the Russo-Ukrainian inter-parliamentary commission, Aleksandr
Lebedev, grudgingly had to admit that masses of Ukrainians flocking to Kyiv and
protesting there, had decided the Ukrainian election. It could not be explained through
the concept of foreign plots and financing (Herd 2005, 15). That was the opinion of
most observers, and Iushchenko’s triumph now led the Belarusian opposition to
criticise the West for not supporting it in similar fashion to topple Lukashenko (Ibid,
8). Putin had been unable to prevent the Orange Revolution and now sought to
minimise the damage. Thus, when Iushchenko, fully aware that Russian elites had
strongly criticised his democratic credentials, suggested that his first trip abroad
would be to Moscow, Putin happily agreed to seek reconciliation between the two
regimes (Kovalova 2007, 184).
Power: Supporting Ianukovych
Putin did not necessarily respect Ukrainian sovereign governance, but in a direct
continuation of previous policy he saw Iushchenko’s visit as an opportunity to
increase continued Russian influence in Ukraine. Previously, in the run-up to the
Ukrainian Presidential election of late 2004, leading Russian actors had supported
Ianukovych with a sum of at least 50 million dollars and possibly 300 million dollars
(Velychenko 2007, 5). That this had not led to the desired outcome was mostly
blamed on outside interference. By December 2004, when a swift election for
Ianukovych was scuppered, Putin ‘compared the West with “a fellow in a colonial
helmet” [and] reproached Washington for wanting to impose “a dictatorship in
international affairs under the guise of pseudo democratic rhetoric”’ (Nugaired 2004).
Russian political analysts argued similarly, with Viacheslav Nikonov stating:
‘Ukraine is next in line for the execution of the American plan of ‘velvet revolution,’
[...] the secret service operation to replace regimes that have not already been tested
successes as “banana republics” by the USA, already accomplished in states in
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Eastern Europe or Georgia’ (Nikonov 2004). In Ukraine, until his defeat in the
repeated electoral runoff, Ianukovych sought to deflect the blame for his impending
defeat: ‘A large number of organisations sponsored by the USA have worked in
Ukraine for many years. America interferes with the internal affairs of Ukraine’
(Bogdanov 2004). In Belarus, there was evidently a similar fear of Western influence
and pressure for regime change. In late December 2004, twenty opposition youth
activists from United Civic Party regional and city organisations were detained for
participating in an unauthorised demonstration celebrating the victory of the
Ukrainian opposition (Herd 2005, 8). Yet the Belarusian and Russian leaderships had
to accept that they could not keep Iushchenko from power. As a second-best solution,
however, maybe Iushchenko could be persuaded not to unite with the West against
Russia. In January 2005, Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov noted that ‘not all [states]
have succeeded in getting rid of stereotypes from the past. This shows in the reaction
of some circles in Europe and the USA to the political crisis in Ukraine [and in their
declarations] that “Ukraine has to join forces with the West”’ (Gavrilov and Chirkin
2005). After Iushchenko’s regime was beset by domestic troubles in 2006, the former
head of the Russian presidential administration, Aleksandr Voloshin, went on a semi-
official mission to the USA, where he complained that expanded American activity
had problematised events in Ukraine and elsewhere in the post-Soviet region, an area
that Russia could rightfully lay claim to (Sidorov 2006). At this time, the recent
dearth of Western economic and other support for Iushchenko showed Voloshin that
the government of Ukraine might be persuaded that Russia could offer Ukraine more
than the West could. And despite the spats that had taken place between the Russian
political elite and Lukashenko, it seemed clear in Belarus, too, that Western help
would not be forthcoming. By May 2007, the lack of Western assistance had finally
convinced some members of the Belarusian opposition that governance by Moscow
would be a lesser evil than Lukashenko. Uladzimer Parfenovich and Leanid Sinitsyn
duly published a manifesto that favoured associated member-status for Belarus in the
Russian Federation (Sinitsyn 2007). Lukashenko opposed this, but he was even more
averse than Putin to Western intervention. Thus, it came as no surprise when in
October 2007 Russia, Belarus and other post-Soviet governments presented a plan for
monitoring all elections in OSCE member-states equally, and for reducing the amount
of monitoring: ‘[...] the number of [OSCE] observers [at a given election] shall not
exceed 50 people’. This would prevent the OSCE from establishing whether elections
were free and fair and would thus reduce the risk of an unpleasant Iushchenko-like
surprise cropping up in Putin and Lukashenko’s way in future (Bausin et al. 2007).
Nation: Disparaging the Ambassador
Still, such measures would not help the Russians to get rid of Lukashenko. Indeed,
within Belarus the Belarusian President was now becoming increasingly popular
relative to the Russian leadership. Already, Putin had suggested incorporating, and
thus neutralising, the Belarusian central administration into an expanded Russia. Yet
this seemed decreasingly popular in Belarus, and not just among Lukashenko’s
supporters. In November 2004, following suspension of Russian gas to Belarus,
inhabitants of Belarus for the first time favoured Lukashenko to Putin. Answering the
question ‘If the position of President for Belarus and Russia was established whom
would you vote for?’ 30 per cent supported Lukashenko, against Putin’s 24 per cent.
Putin had previously been favoured, notably gaining 51 per cent to Lukashenko’s 14
per cent in April 2002 (Drakakhrust 2006, 113). Putin’s role in the Ukrainian turmoil
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during this time worried inhabitants of Belarus, who did not want similar unrest. The
peaceful outcome of the Ukrainian election had not seemed certain, particularly after
Ianukovych’s menacing statement in November: ‘Today we’re on the edge of
catastrophe [...] When the first drop of blood is spilled, we won’t be able to stop it’
(‘Vybory’ 2004). And even if Putin had not promoted Ukrainian civil war,
parliamentarians in Russia supporting him had been more willing to do so. Luzhkov
was now a member of United Russia, openly supporting Putin, and in December the
Mayor of Moscow visited eastern and southern Ukrainian regions including Donetsk,
Luhan’sk and Crimea, the leaders of which vowed to pursue strategies of greater
autonomy from the central Ukrainian government by any possible means, should
Iushchenko win the election. As mentioned earlier, Luzhkov repeatedly visited
Severodonetsk to express his support (‘Komu’ 2004). Lukashenko was unwilling to
be similarly undermined. In mid-2005, the Kremlin appointed the governor of Saratov
region, Dmitrii Aiatskov, as ambassador to Belarus. However, after he spoke
disparagingly about Lukashenko at a press conference in his hometown, ‘the
Belarusian [administration] strongly opposed his appointment’, Aiatskov never went
to Minsk, and by February 2006 Aleksandr Surikov became ambassador instead
(‘Rossiiskii’ 2006). Yet while the Russian government deferred to Lukashenko, at
least in this instance, Iushchenko’s regime was still being obstructed. Supplies of
natural gas to and through Ukraine were halted on January 1, 2006, just when the
Ukrainian political system was most vulnerable during its transformation from a
presidential to a presidential-parliamentary system (Flikke 2008, 385). Although no
political turmoil ensued, the dispute showed Iushchenko’s political skills in an
unflattering light, while a Russia-friendly parliamentary opposition could argue that
increased power to them would mean less difficult relations with Russia in future.
Iushchenko had been forced to cede some presidential power to the parliament in
order to come to power, but Lukashenko could not be similarly undermined. Russian
criticism of Lukashenko was therefore sometimes forced to use other means,
including slander. In November 2006, for instance, Russian journalists quoted his
family’s neighbour: ‘We all drank and we’re going on drinking [...] the President’s
uncle [...] can tell you the recipe for home-brewed alcohol in details’, while in
January 2007 even the normally measured analyst Iuliia Latynina denounced
Lukashenko as ‘the demonstrative parasite in Minsk’ (Bobrova 2006) (Ivanov 2007).
Still, Lukashenko knew that such comments would be resented by inhabitants of
Belarus in general, and he was determined to exploit any waning in Belarusian public
support for the Russian leadership. In January 2007, dismissing Western and Russian
interference alike, he stated that ‘as long as we’re not disturbed [by other states] our
people can figure out things for themselves. We don’t need either “coloured” or “gas
revolutions!”’ (‘My’ 2007). Putin’s administration was hardly impressed and
continued to undermine Belarusian governance, not least by halting energy supplies.
Ukraine could be damaged, too. In September 2007, following the Ukrainian
parliamentary elections where Tymoshenko’s bloc gained 31 per cent of the votes,
threats by Gazprom to cut supplies to Ukraine were followed by Putin’s
announcement that Ukraine should pay a price closer to the international average
(Copsey 2008, 306). Even though Tymoshenko was now much more reconciliatory
towards Russia, Putin intended to demonstrate the consequences of challenging
Russia.
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Ideology
Law: Ukraine in the EU
Russian respect for Belarusian and Ukrainian ideological sovereignty had decreased
during the first term of Putin’s presidency. During the second term, he did profess his
support for Ukrainian membership in international organisations such as the EU, but
his professed support, given in December 2004, can easily be linked to his desire to
persuade Ukrainians to vote for Ianukovych in the presidential election. Moreover,
Putin was clearly aware how impossible it was for Ukraine to become a member of
the EU even in the medium term (Tsygankov 2005, 148). To refuse any sort of
sovereign international identity for Ukraine would have forced Putin to specify a
Russian vision, and this had not been worked out yet. As Russian analysts
complained: ‘What can we offer Ukraine and the other post-Soviet states today?
Builders of a “new empire” must have a no less weighty domestic ideological
foundation and no less serious foreign policy intent. At present there is neither the
one, nor the other’ (Vladimirov 2004). Without a Russian vision, Ukrainians looked
to GUAM, the organisation they had helped found almost a decade earlier, which in
May 2006 became the Organisation for Democracy and Economic Development. One
of its stated aims was to ‘secure rule of law [and] strengthen European integration’,
squarely positioning the organisation within established, Western norms
(Organizatsiia 1997). Yet in order to achieve these aims, cooperation with democratic
states such as the Baltics and Romania were in order, and these now thought of little
else than their newly-attained membership of the EU. Iushchenko’s Ukraine was
therefore somewhat left to itself. Belarusians, too, felt increasingly peripheral in
Russian international affairs. In October 2006, members of the Belarusian political
elite argued that the Russian elite no longer viewed Belarus as a priority, and that the
Belarusian state therefore should seek a different source of inspiration (Rubinov
2006b). Yet no one any longer knew what that source might be.
Power: Modern Russian Identity and the Spiritual Leader
Putin’s imperial ideology had been clear already during his first presidential term.
Iushchenko’s election in Ukraine brought the momentum of this project to a halt, but
Russian political analysts did not believe that Ukrainians could construct an identity
for their state that would be both European and separated from Russia. In December
2004, Tsipko announced: ‘Russian language and Russian culture are an inseparable
part of European civilisation. At the same time, Ukrainian language – which was
preserved through south-Russian folklore – remains to this day on the fringes of
European civilisation’ (Tsipko 2004). Tsipko and his colleagues believed that
Belarus, too, was peripheral in Europe, unable to have any international impact
without Russian assistance. Similarly, inhabitants in Belarus still agreed that their
future was close to Russia, although, as seen above, not necessarily united with it. A
survey in Belarus from April 2006 showed that 85 per cent perceived Russia as one of
the five friendliest countries towards Belarus, as opposed to 1 per cent who perceived
that Russia was one of the five most unfriendly countries towards Belarus (Ioffe 2008,
201). And according to Anatolii Rubinov, deputy chief of the Belarusian presidential
administration, in July 2006 there was no ideological content in the oft-repeated
phrase calling for a ‘revival’ of the Belarusian nation. Rubinov instead argued that the
identity of the state was bound to the Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic (Rubinov
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2006a). In Ukraine, wistful memories of the Soviet Union belonged to the opposition,
particularly the Communist party. Yet the more general idea of some sort of Eurasian
unity together with Russia was much more widespread. By 2006, the controversial
politician Natalia Vitrenko’s party, Blok, controlled approximately 1,000 seats in
local eastern and southern Ukrainian councils. With her close connections to Russian
Eurasianists, such as Aleksandr Dugin, this political presence was a significant boost
for pro-Russian ideology in Ukraine (Velychenko 2007, 11). However, Ukraine, and
Belarus, too, had to receive benefits from Russia in order to stay loyal, and this had
latterly not been the case. The outcome was increased alienation between the states.
And this remained one of the few venues where Russian political opposition could
criticise Putin. In January 2007, Aleksandr Prokhanov complained that ‘there remains
one Belarus that is the gateway to Europe, that Gazprom were so thoughtlessly
prepared to slam, positioning the relationship of our states and peoples on an
“economic foundation”, which preserved “Russian state [rossiiskii] oil” and the
“Russian state [rossiiskii] budget”’ (Prokhanov 2007). This comment might not have
seen fair to Gazprom as Belarus had repeatedly failed to fulfil its contractual
obligations to the Russian company. The purpose of Gazprom as a company was
hardly to subsidise the Belarusian economy and regime. Still, Gazprom was a state-
controlled company and Prokhanov was correct to point out that naked profit-seeking
to the detriment of the Belarusian economy would not fit with government policies
making Belarus into a subsidised vassal of Russia.
At the same time signs existed that a Russian leadership prepared to subsidise
Belarusian and Ukrainian economies might be able to prevent Belarus and even
Ukraine from allying with the West against Russia. Iushchenko might have become
Ukrainian President, inaugurating Westernised international policies, separate from
and at times, even opposed to, Russia, but his government was soon beset by
infighting. Less than two years after his electoral defeat, Ianukovych had thus come
back as Prime Minister, and with his return Ukraine looked to Russia again. In
January 2007, the new government even ensured that Ukrainian Foreign Minister,
Borys Tarasiuk, who had been closely identified with a pro-Western line for more
than a decade, was dismissed as he had been in the past, following a pattern
previously set by Kuchma (White and McAllister 2008, 10). Despite worries from the
Russian opposition, therefore, powerful indications appeared that Ukraine and Belarus
would remain closely aligned with Russia.
Nation: Rejecting West Ukrainian Leadership
Yet Ukraine and Belarus would only remain closely aligned with Russia if Russians
would tolerate the right of Belarusians and Ukrainians to sometimes take differing
opinions. Some indications existed that intolerance toward difference was growing in
Russia, particularly among so-called panslavists, who enjoyed a state-tolerated
renaissance. In May 2004, at the first Ukrainian-based congress of the Conference of
Slavic Peoples of Ukraine, Russia and Belarus, the leader of the Slavic National
Patriotic Union, Petro Tolochko, stated: ‘If we wish to survive as a civilisation then
we have to unite [if] we [...] should tear ourselves away from Belarus, Russia [...] we
would [...] “come undone”’ (‘Slavianskii’ 2004). The onus here was on Russia to
preserve the bond, but it was obvious that Lukashenko and other Belarusians
criticising Russia would not be tolerated, either. Iushchenko was seen by Tolochko
and his allies as a straightforward enemy. It was therefore tempting for Iushchenko’s
Russian opponents to emphasise this animosity, framing him as hostile to Russians. In
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June 2004, a report allegedly written by Russian spin-doctor Marat Gel’man appeared
in Ukraine. It advocated presenting Iushchenko as an enemy of Crimean Russians by
using unwitting Ukrainian nationalists to provoke land disputes and Tatar retaliation
on the peninsula, showing Iushchenko’s inability to protect local Slavs (‘Tretii’ 2004).
This plan was not successful, but the impression that Iushchenko and Ukrainian
nationalists were out to hurt Russian neighbours was only reinforced as the divisive
presidential campaign developed towards the end of the year. Already in October,
Russian commentators complained: ‘If the “west-Ukrainians” are used to see
themselves as oppressed, why should Ukrainians in the east accept such a detrimental
role? [...] why should the “westerners”, who worship the Polish lord and the American
decree, declare themselves to be the only real Ukrainians’ (Serkov 2004)? This
impression, as I indicated previously, was only reinforced among Russians following
the election. Ukrainians, too, could vilify Russia, denouncing it as almost barbaric.
This shows, for instance, in Tarasiuk’s comment while he still held the post of
Foreign Minister in October 2006: ‘Russia is the Eurasian outskirts. It won’t enter the
EU, since it wants to gain the status of a global great power at the centre of a Slavic
Union’ (Schuler 2006). Although the latter part of Tarasiuk’s statement could be
viewed as recognition of Russia as a great power, the former part linked Russia to a
Tatar past, with Ukraine, incidentally, as the bulwark of civilised Europe. Lukashenko
was prepared to use similar rhetoric in January 2007, in the wake of yet another
energy dispute with Russia: ‘You know, [Belarusians] are an inalienable part of
Europe, the heart of Europe [...] Today has come the time when Europeans realized
that [...] they also have to link their security with that of Belarus’ (‘My’ 2007).
Tarasiuk and Lukashenko seemed to have gone too far; Russia was in many ways as
European as the two smaller states. The lack of tolerance went both ways, however. In
the Russian government Belarus and Ukraine were seldom denounced as alien to
Europe since Russia, as Tarasiuk had correctly pointed out, was simply not just part
of Europe, but a special international actor. Yet less prominent Russian politicians did
highlight the insular, xenophobic nature of Ukraine. This was most forcefully
indicated to me in an interview with a member of the Russian Federation Council in
May 2007. Repeatedly, claims appeared that Ukrainians wanted a state purified of
Moskali (a derogatory word for ethnic Russians), Muslims and other outsiders
(Interview with member 2007). This was presented as a disease unique to western
Ukraine, whereas the eastern regions had much more in common with Russia. To me
it was quite clear that the politician in question would view a split Ukraine as a
natural development and, although the Russian leadership might not overtly share this
sentiment, it no longer sought to counter it.
Conclusion
Between 2004 and 2008, the paradigm of Power dominated Russian perceptions of
Belarusian and Ukrainian political sovereignty. In territorial matters, Putin ensured
Belarusians that integration would go as far as they were ready for it to go, while the
Union budget indeed increased substantially. Furthermore, opinion polls taken among
executive elites in Russia showed that Putin had strong domestic support for his plans
for integration with other post-Soviet states. In matters relating to governance,
Russian elites openly and consistently supported Ianukovych during the Ukrainian
presidential election. Putin complained about Western interference, while Sergei
Ivanov claimed that old stereotypes continued to dominate thinking in the EU and
North America. What these and other actors indicated was subsequently confirmed by
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Voloshin, the former senior aide to El'tsin and Putin, who told the American
administration that Ukraine and the rest of the post-Soviet region constituted part of a
Russian sphere of interest. Finally, in matters relating to ideology, prominent Russian
commentators, such as Tsipko, portrayed Russia as spiritual leader of the Slavic
community and the only medium through which peripheral Ukrainians and
Belarusians could enter Europe. Many Russians believed their state had a duty to
assist this development, for instance, through unquestioned, generous subsidies or
through political alliances with dominant parties abroad, such as that existing between
Dugin and Vitrenko in Ukraine.
The paradigm of Nation also significantly influenced Russian perceptions of
Belarusian and Ukrainian political sovereignty. In issues concerning territory, Putin
showed that any previous border agreement could be annulled. Most notoriously, he
threatened revanchism against Ukraine if it joined NATO, and he endorsed Luzhkov
to visit eastern Ukraine and support regional separatism. Strongly voiced protests
resulted, not just from Ukrainians but also from Belarus, where Lukashenko
compared Putin with Stalin and threatened a new Chechnia. In matters concerning
governance, the Russian government showed a distinct lack of respect for the
Ukrainian democratic choice of Iushchenko. Energy and other types of disruption
were introduced at the most critical times for the Ukrainian polity, for instance, during
its transition from a presidential to a parliamentary system, while the Russia-endorsed
presidential candidate in Ukraine, Ianukovych, warned of civil war when his election
did not progress smoothly. Finally, in issues concerning ideology Russian
commentators increasingly appealed to Russians in Ukraine, who should rebel against
the alleged hijacking of their state by West Ukrainian nationalists. Although rumours
that a Russian spin-doctor in Ukraine tried to provoke inter-ethnic strife to discredit
Iushchenko were not confirmed, local political elites certainly took offence. If
Tarasiuk and Lukashenko could agree on one thing, this was apparently that their
states were more European than Russia.
Conversely, the paradigm of Law was insignificant. Russians declared that territorial
disagreements with Ukraine should be solved by international law, but they did not
follow up such words with action. Similarly, Iushchenko’s visit to Moscow early in
his presidency, a visit intended to alleviate some Russian concerns following his
election, was not appreciated by Putin. Finally, Putin could easily suggest Ukrainian
membership of Western organisations such as the EU when he knew this would not
soon become a possibility.
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